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Birger Hjørland
Informetrics Needs a Foundation in the
Theory of Science
Introduction
The terms “bibliometrics”, “informetrics” and “scientometrics” are—unless oth-
erwise specified—considered synonymous in this chapter. They refer to quantita-
tive studies of documents, collections of documents, and derived patterns (e.g.,
maps based on co-citations or bibliographic coupling, or evaluative techniques
such as journal impact factor (JIF), or the h-index). They also cover webometrics
and statistical patterns such as Bradford’s law, Lotka’s law, and Zipf’s law.
Traditionally, many informetrics studies have been made by using scientific
and scholarly databases (e.g., Science Citation Index) and those studies thereby
represent studies of scholarly literatures (thus this subset of informetrics may be
termed “scientometrics”). By implication, scientometrics is a “science of science”,
a “metascience” or a field of “science studies” as also put forward by Bates (1999,
p. 1044). The family of metasciences includes fields such as the history of science,
the philosophy of science, and the sociology of science, mentioning only themost
important,¹ where the term “science” is not limited to natural science but covers
all fields of scholarship. Themain points in this paper are: (1) information science
with informetrics belongs to themeta-sciences, (2) these meta-sciences are mutu-
ally interdependent, (3) all meta-fields are also dependent on subject knowledge,
and (4) “post-Kuhnian” views of knowledge are based on social, historical, and
pragmatic perspectives (rather than on individualistic and foundational perspec-
tives).
We shall start by having a brief introduction to the most important meta-
sciences: The history of science typically studies lines of development (diachronic
analysis) in science and the life and works of great scientists often based on sci-
entific literature as well as unpublished sources focusing on science as a whole,
a single discipline, or a specific period or aspect. The principles of such historical
studies are developed in the field called historiography and the principles of the
history of science are developed in the subfield called historiography of science.
1 Here, I am using science studies in a broader meaning than, for example, Collin (2011) who
does not consider philosophy of science as a part of science studies.
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The philosophy of science is typically based on rationalist principles putting
forward normative criteria for scientific work and scientific methodology and is
not usually based on empirical or historical studies.² The logical positivists sug-
gested one family of norms in the first part of the 20th century: there is a universal
and a priori scientific method; theories must be translatable into observational
terms; the doctrines of behaviorism, operationalism, andmethodological individ-
ualism; and the reduction of research objects into “variables”. Such norms can
still be found in textbooks of empirical methodologies in the social sciences, al-
though logical positivism today is generally considered an unsuccessful project
based on unfruitful premises. Philosopher Karl Popper developed another set of
norms based on the principle of falsificationism whereby good research should:
(1) provide scientific statements, hypotheses, and theories which are precise in
having an inherent possibility to be proven false, (2) should not be based on em-
pirical generalisations, but should put forward theorieswhich are bold and coura-
geous, and (3) should submit scientific theories to rigorous tests. The implications
of theories should be logically deduced and empirically tested; the best scien-
tific knowledge is able to resist careful scrutiny from the scientific community.
Philosophical positions and traditions such as hermeneutics, pragmatism, critical
studies, and qualitativemethodologies developed another set of normswhich tend
to emphasise thehistorical nature of thinking; the active role of the researcher; the
study of conceptions, theories, and the dialectics between subject and object; and
emphasize that an object is always an object for a subject and a subject is always
historically, socially, and culturally situated.
The sociology of science typically studies empirical studies on scientific activ-
ities, both internally in science and in their relations to broader society (power,
economy, and policies). The field of scientometrics is often considered by sociolo-
gists of science as a part of their field (just as we in information science consider it
part of ourfield). Thefield is closely related to “cultural studies of science”.Among
the important concepts in the sociology of science are “Mode 2” research and
“triple helix” which emphasise the growing influence of industrial and commer-
cial interests in the scientific system. Other important questions involve gender
issues, the role of social class and ethnicity, the career system, and issues that
motivate scientists to do things in the way they are done (versus how they could
have be done).
Information science with informetrics typically studies information systems
and information services; “memory institutions” such as research libraries, bib-
2 Although Kuhn’s philosophy of science, for example, represents a historicist philosophy of sci-
ence.
22 | Birger Hjørland
liographic databases, knowledge organisation systems (see Stock, this volume);
as well as the users, non-users, and potential users of such information systems
and services. This field studies the whole system of actors, institutions, and ser-
vices connecting information producers and users (cf., Søndergaard, Andersen, &
Hjørland, 2003). Information science is largely an empirical field, but is also a nor-
mative field (studying, promoting, and providing standards for many aspects of
scientific communication). While relatively distinct from the other meta-sciences
given its purpose to contribute to optimal scientific communication and utilisa-
tion of recorded knowledge, information science often represents a design or con-
struction perspective and a relation to the practice of librarianship, documenta-
tion, and information services that makes it relatively unique.
When it is claimed that informetrics belongs to the meta-sciences, it may be
argued that this field is much broader than the scientific domain and today in-
cludes, among other things, webometrics and thus link-structures from all sectors
of broader society as well as ordinary peoples’ relation to information. Although
this is correct, two things should be recognized: (1) Within the narrower field of
science, it is important to consider the relation between scientometrics and the
domain of science in order to understand and explain bibliometric patterns; and
(2) In the broader field of other sectors of society and of everyday information
use, the same principles may also provide a fruitful basis for understanding in-
formation science and informetrics. It is wrong and harmful to ignore the field
of meta-sciences because it is considered too narrow (which is an argument fre-
quently encountered in schools of library and information science because of the
emphasis often placed on public libraries and information services for broader
society). We shall return to the importance of the philosophy of science for non-
scientific domains later.
Meta-sciences aremutually interdependent and all of themare also—first and
foremost—dependent on subject knowledge of the fields of knowledge they are
studying. In order to understand and evaluate research on say, the history of psy-
chology, one must do so based on knowledge about the field of psychology, what
counts as psychological knowledge, and what is a success or a blind alley in psy-
chology. The same is the case whenwe have to interpret or evaluate a bibliometric
map of psychology—and in order to even draw it, first we need to identify which
documents are psychological on which to draw the map (this is discussed in de-
tails later in this chapter). In both cases, we have an example of a hermeneutic
circle: in order to study a domain, you must delimit it, and in order to delimit it,
you must have knowledge about it. In other words: A lack of subject knowledge
on the part of meta-scientists may provide problematic interpretations of the em-
pirical patterns observed.
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Examples of interaction between the meta-sciences are Garfield’s (2004)
bibliometric contribution to historiography and Griffith’s (1979) bibliometrically
based criticism of some assumptions in the philosophy of science. On the other
hand, Kuhn’s (1962) theory of paradigms inspired bibliometric researchers to try
to identify paradigms empirically (cf. Chen, 2003). This chapter will briefly in-
troduce the relation between philosophy of science and other meta-sciences, but
will mainly focus on the relation between the theory of science and informetrics.
Philosophy of science after logical positivism
Often stated, Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) book the Structure of Scientific Revolutions
brought an end to logical positivism. Although this is disputed,³ the opposition
between “positivism” and “post-Kuhnian philosophy” provides the foundation
for this chapter; but what is (logical) positivism andwhat—if anything—has really
changed in the ground swell of Kuhn?
Defining “positivism” is not easy.⁴ There are many different positions in both
classical and logical positivism, just as there are different interpretations of these
positions (see, for example, Reisch, 2005 for a recent re-interpretation). A com-
mon view is that the term “positivism” includes three main characteristics:
1. the use of quantitative methodologies,
2. the use of scientific methods (as opposed to hermeneutic methods in the so-
cial sciences and humanities), and
3. the belief in realism and objectivity.
Given that Kuhnopposedpositivism, an easy conclusion is that theunderstanding
of positivism expressed in the first and second points must be wrong. Kuhn was a
physicist by training andphysics is based onmeasurements—hence a quantitative
discipline. Of course, Kuhn did not end physics or its quantitative methodology
and therefore it does not make sense to understand positivism in the first and
second sense. Kuhn’s revolution in the philosophy of science must have another
3 The Danish philosopher Stig Andur Pedersen (1995) demonstrated that even if Kuhn’s theory
represents a clash with positivist ideas it is in many ways a natural continuation of the work of
the logical positivists in the 1940s and 1950s . Friedman (2003), Moges (2010) and Reisch (1991)
made related observations. Tsou (2015), however, maintains that the logical positivism of Rudolf
Carnap and Kuhn’s work represent two distinctive traditions of doing philosophy of science.
4 “Questions such as ‘Is thesis T a positivist (empiricist, idealist, realist etc.) thesis?’ are notori-
ously difficult.” (Bird, 2004, p. 338).
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meaning (if the first view was correct, informetrics per definition would be posi-
tivist, which I will argue it cannot be).
The third view (that positivism is a realist position) is more complicated, but
is generally consideredwrong in the philosophy of science. For logical positivism,
speaking about any reality behind observations or causing observations is meta-
physical and metaphysics is considered illegitimate. “What exists in reality” is
consideredametaphysical questionandopposed to thepositivist spirit. It is rather
well-established in the philosophy of science that empiricism/positivism and re-
alism are different positions. It can even be argued that positivism is less realistic
compared tomore interpretative positions because it is better to have explicit sub-
jectivity than to have subjectivity disguised as objectivity. Such an argument will
be put forward below.
What then is positivism? Perhaps we can best describe it as the belief in “the
Leibnizian ideal”:
The Leibnizian ideal holds that all disputes aboutmatters of fact can be impartially resolved
by invoking appropriate rules of evidence. At least since Bacon, most philosophers have
believed there to be an algorithm or set of algorithms which would permit any impartial
observer to judge the degree to which a certain body of data rendered different explanations
of those data true or false, probable or improbable […] But whether optimists or pessimists,
rationalists or empiricist,most logicians andphilosophers of science from the 1930s through
the 1950s believed, at least in principle, in the Leibnizian ideal.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 5–6)
Although Kuhn was not the first to question this ideal,⁵ The Structure of Scientific
Revolutionsnonetheless had the greatest impact on the fall of the Leibnizian ideal.
What Kuhn brought to the forefront in the philosophy of science was the under-
standing that scientists are trained and socialized in paradigm-centered scientific
communities and much of what they do and think is based on the experiences
from their daily work with experiments. According to Mallery, Hurwitz, and Duffy
(1992), the notion of a paradigm-centered scientific community is analogous to
Gadamer’s notion of a linguistically encoded social tradition. Therefore, we could
say thatKuhn’s philosophy is closer tohermeneutics than topositivism.Kuhn thus
contributed in changing philosophy of science from an individualist to a social
epistemology (cf. Wray, 2011). Not only do explicit theories govern scientists’ ac-
tivities, but also do tacit knowledge.
5 Names like Dewey (1929), Feyerabend (1975), Hanson (1958) and Toulmin (1953) deserve to be
mentioned in this context.
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Logical positivism must therefore be understood in contrast to socially and
historically oriented philosophies of science. Logical positivism was an attempt
to combine two former traditions—rationalism and empiricism:
logical positivism arose as the joint product of two intellectual traditions [rationalism and
empiricism] that conflicted deeply with one another: In attempting to unite these traditions,
its adherents created an extremely influential approach to philosophy but one that embod-
ied serious intellectual tensions from its dual ancestry.
(Smith, 1986, p. 64)
In order tounderstandphilosophyof science after logical positivism, it is therefore
important to understand the inherent limitations of empiricism and rationalism
(in this paper only empiricism is analyzed).
As a doctrine in epistemology, empiricismholds that all knowledge ultimately
is based on experience; but empiricism should not be confused with the need for
science to be empirical, is it rather about certain ideals governing empirical stud-
ies. Widely recognised today, sciences are empirical in a broad understanding of
the term. In psychology, empiricism is in particular associated with behaviorism,
the “objective” study of stimuli and responses in organisms. The limitations of
behaviorism were strongly exposed by the linguist and cognitive scientist Noam
Chomsky (who explicitly subscribed to rationalism), who wrote:
A typical example of ‘stimulus control’ for [the behaviorist] Skinner would be the response
to a piece of music with the utterance Mozart or to a painting with the response Dutch.
These responses are asserted to be ‘under the control of extremely subtle properties’ of the
physical object or event (108). Suppose instead of saying Dutch we had said Clashes with
the wallpaper, I thought you liked abstract work, Never saw it before, Tilted, Hanging too
low, Beautiful, Hideous, Remember our camping trip last summer?, or whatever else might
come into our minds when looking at a picture (in Skinnerian translation, whatever other
responses exist in sufficient strength). Skinner could only say that each of these responses
is under the control of some other stimulus property of the physical object.
(Chomsky, 1959, p. 31)
The behaviorism of Skinner is a version of logical positivism attempting to predict
and control human behavior in terms of “stimuli” and “responses”. It may under-
stand itself as “objective science”but, asChomsky’s criticismdemonstrates, in the
case where a human being is looking at a painting and provides some response,
we are unable to tell what in the painting elicited the specific response: the stim-
ulus is not objectively given for the researcher. Because there is no objective way
to identify the stimulus, there is of course a great possibility that the behaviorist/
positivist psychologist uses his/her own subjective perception of the picture as the
basis for studying other peoples’ stimulus-response relations. If the psychologist
26 | Birger Hjørland
is unaware of how the picture may be understood by different cultures and sub-
cultures, his/her own cultural understandingmay influence his/her perception of
the psychology of the observer.
An example from history may also illustrate the same point. When history
was established as a scholarly discipline in the United States, “universalism” was
assumed, i.e., that,
Truthwas one, the same for all people. It was, in principle, accessible to all and addressed to
all. Particular commitments —national, regional, ethnic, religious, ideological—were seen
as enemies of objective truth […] The close connection which historians saw between de-
tachment and objectivity made them sympathetic to Mannheim’s celebration of the vantage
point of free-floating and socially detached observers, whose liberation from particularist
loyalties allowed them to approach closer to objectivity.
(Novick, 1988, p. 469)
However, this universalism was later challenged:
The entry of large numbers of Jews into the upper reaches of the [historical] profession in
the 1950s and early 1960s was widely seen as the fulfillment of universalist norms. It was
otherwise with the arrival of blacks and women from the late sixties and onward. For their
rise to prominence within the profession coincided with a new, assertive, particularist con-
sciousness which both directly and indirectly challenged universalist norms. They defined
themselves not as “historians who happened to be Negroes,” with a consensually accept-
able integrationist standpoint, but as black historians, committed to one or another form of
cultural nationalism…
(Novick, 1988, p. 470; emphasis in original)
In short: Positivism is associated with the idea that researchers’ subjectivity does
not matter or may be eliminated while post-Kuhnian philosophy acknowledges
the influence of subjectivity. The idea that male, middle-class, white historians
maybe able to describe history in neutralways has been challenged just as has the
idea about behavioral psychologists being able to describe stimulus-response pat-
terns objectively. Somewhat paradoxically this makes positivism a less objective
and less realist science compared to hermeneutics and related traditions: pos-
itivism turns out to be a form of subjective idealism in which the researcher’s
cultural background and theoretical understanding is neglected and therefore
cannot be taken into account.⁶
6 An anonymous reviewer commented: “positivism turns out to be a form of subjective
idealism—only if you’re characterizing positivism froman anti-positivist position, surely? There’s
no ‘paradox’ there.” Answer: Yes, there is a real paradox in positivism. You cannot get rid of this
criticism just by ignoring it. The implication of what the reviewer says is that any position is a
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Kuhn introduced the concept of “paradigms”, which has been heavily dis-
cussed. In this chapter a paradigm is understood as a system of assumptions,
concepts, values, andpractices that constitute away of viewing reality. Paradigms
influence theway scientists see things and describe them. Perception is not a neu-
tral collection of data onwhich theories are afterwards developed, but perception
itself is theory-laden. Scientists in different paradigms see the world differently
and describe it differently. Concepts in one paradigm are not the same in another
paradigm thusmakingparadigms incommensurable. This is in sharp conflictwith
the Leibnizian ideal because it changes the nature of scientists from objective cal-
culators to socially conditioned subjects. It also means that scientific knowledge
is not seen as a commonly agreed body of knowledge, but as different theories
full of disagreements (although Kuhn himself saw science as governed by one
paradigmat a time, the general post-Kuhnian tendency is tounderstand science as
consisting of competing paradigms at any point in time). Kuhn added the histori-
cist understanding that knowledge develops in historically constituted paradigms
and this historical or evolutionary dimension (in addition to the social dimension)
is important in order to understand the development of science. Finally, Kuhnalso
added the axiological dimension: Scientists may be governed by different goals
and values.
The following quote by Michael Kleineberg expresses a view that has gained
a stronghold today:
In the process of knowing, the known and the knower seem to be inextricably interwoven.
Knowledge as it appears in the consciousness of human beings is always knowledge about
something for someone. The now widely accepted epistemic pluralism maintains that the
validity of knowledge claims depends on the epistemic framework of the knower and cannot
be judged from a neutral “view from nowhere”. The knower as an agent of epistemic activity
is always already embodied as a material organism and embedded in a social and cultural
environment at a certain point in time and space. In other words, the prerequisites to create,
represent, organize, and communicate knowledge or information are limited by precondi-
tions which are investigated by theories of knowledge and constitute the epistemological
dimension.
(Kleineberg, 2014, p. 80)
This quote may sound relativistic (and Kuhn is often accused of being relativist).⁷
Of course, any paradigm is not as fruitful as any other, although the difficulty is
fruitful as any other and that disagreeing arguments can just be ignored. To say that any theoret-
ical position is true from its own point of view represent a problematic relativism.
7 An anonymous reviewer of this chapter wrote: “In this very interesting chapter, the author ar-
gues that, asmeta-scientists, designers and evaluators of informetric studies should heed certain
claims of “post-Kuhnian” philosophy of science—e.g., that the goal of science/meta-science is
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again that an evaluation of paradigms cannot be accomplished from a neutral
“view fromnowhere”. However, as Kleineberg (2014)writes: “If the claim ‘nothing
is valid for all contexts’ was true, then it would contradict itself since this state-
ment appears as a universal claim as well” (p. 85).
We conclude this section with a quote from historian Christopher Lloyd:
“Perhaps the greatest advance in understanding the nature of explanation made in the
post-positivist and post-Kuhnian era is the general realization that methodologies, theories,
and explanations are related to each other via extra-logical, historically variable constella-
tions variously described as ‘background knowledge’, ‘traditions’, ‘paradigms’, ‘research
programmes’, ‘fields’, or ‘domains’. We can call all of these ‘framework concepts.’
(Lloyd, 1993, p. 32)
Intermezzo: social constructivism is not an
alternative to positivism
Before we consider the implications of the Kuhnian revolution in the philosophy
of science, it is necessary to consider social constructivism because this position
is strongly influential today:
Originally proposed by sociologists of science, constructivism or social constructivism is a
view about the nature of scientific knowledge held by many philosophers of science. Con-
structivists maintain that scientific knowledge is made by scientists and not determined
by the world. This makes constructivists antirealists. […] Constructivism is more aptly com-
pared with Berkeley’s idealism.
(Downes, 1998, vol. 2, p. 624)
Sociologists of science, such as Bloor (1991), amain figure in the so-called “Strong
Programme”, conduct empirical studies of (natural) scientists and some of them
claim fromsuchfindings to demonstrate howscientists construct scientific knowl-
edge (rather than discover the truth). Bloor based the sociology of science on the
following principles (here quoted from Finn Collin):
not to discover objective (i.e., mind- or context-independent) truths about the world; that, in any
case, there is no way (e.g., a neutral “view from nowhere”) for scientists to discover objective
truths about the world; that, in any case, there are no objective truths about the world; that, in
any case, there is no objective reality—and should recognize the historically-, culturally-, and
institutionally-specific nature of their findings.” Answer: I did not made these claims, these are
something that the reviewer read into the chapter. The pragmatic view of truth and objectivity
is complicated, but most pragmatists do think that it is possible to give a pragmatic account of
objectivity that avoids bad relativism and conventionalism; see Bernstein (2010, 106–124).
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1. It [the sociology of science] would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which
bring about belief or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart
from social ones which will cooperate in bringing about belief.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success
or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies require examination.
3. It would be symmetrical in this style of explanation. The same types of cause would ex-
plain, say, true and false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable
to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for
general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology
would be a standing refutation of its own theories.
These conditions are meant to express a commitment to what Bloor sees as an uncontro-
versial, mainstream conception of science; thereby, he intends to safeguard the scientific
credentials of the programme.
(Collin, 2011, p. 37)
Collin continues pointing out how the above characteristics looks like a commit-
ment, not to scientific rigor as such, but to a commitment to the idealized concep-
tion of science constructed and propagated by logical positivism. Other philoso-
phers (e.g., Kjørup, 2008) have also shown how Bloor’s ideas are related to those
of logical positivism. My own thoughts related to the problem of subject knowl-
edge (or lack thereof) inmuch of meta-science come to the same conclusion: How
is it possible for sociologists to study the activities of scientists without proper
knowledge about the subject matter of those activities? (Recall Skinner’s interpre-
tation of peoples’ reaction to a painting.) How can sociologists decide which acts
are important and which are trivial? How is it decided which acts turn out to be
fruitful andwhich are futile? In order tomake these decisions, one needs detailed
knowledge about the arguments for and against a given theory strengthened or
falsified by those acts. To claim that a neutral and objective description of scien-
tific activities is possible without proper subject knowledge is a mistake related
to positivist doctrines. As formerly described, such positivist “objectivity” has of-
ten been demonstrated as imposing upon the researcher his/her own subjective
biases into descriptions and claims.
Social constructivism seems to be based on a paradox: its own research is
“true” in claiming the impossibility of objective research. Additionally, it seems
to underestimate how difficult it is to produce knowledge and theories that are
consistent (i.e., how much resistance reality makes in the construction of theo-
ries). While they are right that there is an element of contingency in science this
does not mean that scientists can produce any truth they like. We shall return to
this issue in relation to bibliometric maps.
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Thomas Kuhn has often been used to support relativists and social construc-
tivists, but Kuhn’s philosophy does not imply a strong kind of constructivism (see
Wray, 2011) and Kuhn (2000, p. 110) famously rejected the Strong Programme as
“deconstruction gonemad”. It is important, in the words of Brian Cantwell Smith,
“to steer a path between the Scylla of naive realism and the Charybdis of pure con-
structivism” (Smith, 1996, p. 3). It is ironic that social constructivism –which tend
to regard positivism as its enemy par excellence—itself seems to be based on the
same problematic assumptions about the neutrality of the researcher. Therefore,
(strong) social constructivism is not an alternative to positivism.
Post-Kuhnian perspectives on the meta-sciences
The issue of “positivism” versus “paradigm theory” is important in all specific
sciences (like physics, biology, psychology, and history) as well as in the meta-
sciences described above. In the field of history, Novick (1988) is a valuable ex-
ample of how the American historical profession has dealt with the idea and ideal
of objectivity from its foundation in the 1880s until the book was written. Its par-
ticular value is that it describes concretely how the ideal of objectivity was elab-
orated, challenged, modified, and defended over the last century. The study is
based on, among other sources, the archives of the American Historical Review,
and is thus a demonstration of howdifferent philosophical normshave influenced
decisions for the acceptance of papers for publication in a leading journal (philo-
sophical norms are thus not “merely” philosophical). My analysis of how “post-
Kuhnian” perspectives have changed the meta-sciences does not have the same
differentiated and balanced treatment as Novick, but is here presented in a purely
schematic and tentative form.
A scientific document is a report by a scientist observing the world and a sci-
entometric study is a report by a scientist observing the reports of other scientists.
In both cases, the ways the reports are made reflect norms in the theory of science
(even if thesenormsare implicit or unconscious). Theargument iswider, however:
Even if the documents are not scholarly papers, they are influenced by philosoph-
ical views or ideologies (e.g., by different kinds of -isms in art). All documents are
influenced by some views and interests, and all studies of documents are also
influenced by some kinds of subjectivity, which are partly culturally and socially
shaped. There are thus two levels at play: (1) the traditions and epistemologies
underlying document production and (2) the traditions and epistemologies un-
derlying informetrics, information science, and the study of scholarly communi-
cation. This paper claims that the important theories of level 1 are identical with
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the important theories of level 2 in that both levels may reflect a positivist or alter-
natively apost-Kuhnianphilosophy.Howpost-Kuhnianperspectives have affected
the meta-sciences is outlined in Table 1.
Post-Kuhnian perspectives on informetrics
Belver C. Griffith (1979) criticised howhistory and philosophy of science neglected
bibliometric findings (including Solla Price, 1965, and his own research). Griffith
claims that the empirical studies of science (bibliometrics) have challengedmany
claims in history and philosophy of science including Kuhn’s rejection of “crucial
experiments” in physics: “To have taken this image [provided by bibliometrics]
seriously would have wiped out many ‘hard won distinctions’ that philosophers
had wrested from their own scholarship” (p. 384). Griffith also praised two books
in information science (Brittain, 1970; Meadows, 1974) writing: “The books are,
however, philosophically blind—but perhaps nothing really was lost.” In other
words, in contrast to this article, Griffith did not expect philosophy of science to
be important for information science.
That philosophy is indeed important for science can be expressed with a
quote by Albert Einstein:
The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They are de-
pendent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty
scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and
muddled.
(Einstein, 1949, p. 683–684)⁸
My aim it thus twofold: (1) To argue about the importance of philosophy of sci-
ence (against Griffith, 1979, among others, probably including the silent majority
of researchers), and (2) to outline what I see as the most important philosophical
perspective for informetrics.
8 Einstein’s relation to positivism is expressed in this quote: “I am not a Positivist. Positivism
states that what cannot be observed does not exist. This conception is scientifically indefensible,
for it is impossible tomake valid affirmations of what people ‘can’ or ‘cannot’ observe. Onewould
have to say ‘only what we observe exists’, which is obviously false” (Einstein, 2005, p. 238). This
quote is of course too simplistic to say something about positivism as well as Einstein’s philos-
ophy of science—or to indicate that Einstein would support my interpretation of post-Kuhnian
philosophy (see Howard, 1993 for a deeper discussion). It is cited only to indicate that positivism
is not necessarily the scientists’ philosophy and that it is justified to challenge it.
Informetrics Needs a Foundation in the Theory of Science | 33
The mirror metaphor
Griffith’s article, entitled Bibliometrics: How faulty a mirror of knowledge? did not,
however, address the problem of its title (but was, asmentioned above, a criticism
that philosophy of science neglected what he considered relevant bibliometric
findings). Here, however, the problem will be directly considered: How faulty a
mirror of science is a bibliometricmap? (Moreover, how canwe examine this?).My
first comment concerns the mirror metaphor,⁹ according which scientific knowl-
edge shall be understood as representing amirror of nature andbibliometricmaps
as representing mirrors of science.
John Dewey (1929, p. 215) criticized what he labelled “the spectator theory of
knowledge” (i.e., the view that the knower is only passively related to the thing
known) as did the pragmatic tradition to which he belonged (see also Rorty,
1979). The pragmatic alternative to the mirror metaphor considers knowledge
(and knowledge representations such as bibliometric maps) as tools and there-
fore they do not evaluate them according to how faulty (or how precise) a mirror
they provide, but according to how well they fulfil their functions as tools for
given tasks (implying that different tasks may require different perspectives). An
example: Boyack and Klavans (2010) asked “Which citation approach represents
the research frontmost accurately?”Asking the question thisway reveals a viewof
knowledge corresponding to the mirror metaphor. One of the problems in asking
which approach is best is that an answer to that question presupposes that there
is a neutral platform from which different approaches may be compared, that we
have a key on which to evaluate different approaches. But we do not have such
a key; we only have different, more or less equivalent approaches, each of which
may claim to be the best. The alternative is to ask: Which bibliometric approach
provides the best tool for a given task? Based on this pragmatic view, I consider
co-citation analysis and bibliometric coupling as two different approaches that
should not be evaluated on providing the most accurate picture, but as different
tools suited for different kinds of tasks (see Hjørland, 2013). To understand bib-
liographical coupling is to understand the degree of overlap in different authors’
citation identity, while to understand co-citation patterns is to understand the
reception history and scholarly impact of documents. My suggestions may of
course be questioned and further examined, but the point here is to follow John
Dewey and question the mirror view of knowledge and its use in informetrics
today.
9 The mirror metaphor is also known as “the picture theory of knowledge”, “the mimetic nature
of information”, and “the spectator theory of knowledge”.
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Selection of sources: a hermeneutical circle
A strong argument about the non-neutrality of bibliometric maps concerns the
selection of the journals (or other sources) on which a given map is constructed.
In a former paper I wrote:
Imagine that we are going to create a map of LIS. As Åström (2002) showed, former maps,
such as that of White and McCain (1998), seem to have a bias towards information science.
In order to provide a better alternative, Åström also includedmore library-oriented journals
in his study. However, there is no objective criterion for judgingwhich documents best repre-
sent LIS, and any selected set of journals can always be shown to have a bias in some direction
or another.
(Hjørland, 2013, p. 1322; emphasis in original)
Bibliometric researchers are mostly explicit about which journals they used in
their studies, and thus about their selection. This means that their research is ob-
jective in the sense that other researchers may replicate it. However, the claim put
forward here is that bibliometricans do not usually make explicit arguments for
how the journals were selected in relation to their conception of the field. It is as
if the researchers’ view of the domain in question is considered ‘obvious’ or of no
consequence, or that this would provide a kind of subjectivity that is antithetical
to the positivist ideals of the authors. White and McCain (1998, p. 329), for exam-
ple, wrote about co-citation maps: “The maps transcend the viewpoint—and the
individual biases—of any one observer.” The authors also argued that their choice
of journals reflects “mainstream information science” and “journals with strong
IS [information science] orientations, as indicated by title and scope statements”.
However, frommy point of view their conception of information science seems to
be biased towards “library automation”. If I had to make the choice of journals,
other journals should have been added (or replaced the library automation jour-
nals), because in my conception information science is less technology-oriented
and more socially-oriented. My point is that we all have our different views of
what the core information science journals are and that such a view necessarily
influence study of the field. Therefore a bibliometric map is a subjective represen-
tation, not an objective one. Any researcher may have a specific interest (e.g., in
facet analysis) and the journals/information sourceswith the best coverage of that
focus could be determined. If not included in the bibliometric investigation, this
could be considered a “bias” in the study. This is not an insignificant complaint
because such maps are extremely vulnerable to such choices.
A study by Schneider (2010) may also confirm this view:
The highly specialized character of Scientometrics compared to the other journals in this set,
i.e., a larger share of publications and the large number of unique authors that only publish
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in the journal, obviously exacerbates the influence of this journal to the arbitrary construct
named IS. This raises some important questions on how fields ought to be delimited if at all
and how publications should be selected for mapping purposes. It is first of all a sampling
problem rather than a normalization problem. It is not a question of right or wrong. It is
the simple fact stemming from the phenomena of skewed distributions. Very few mapping
studies address this issue.
(Schneider, 2010, p. 257)
Schneider says that the domain under study, information science, is an “arbitrary
construct” and that it has important consequences whether a given journal is or
is not considered a part of the domain. I see this as a very strong support of my
claim that informetrics researchers have to base their studies on an explicate view
of what the field is, and what it should be.
We have a kind of hermeneutic circle: How can we identify a field by a set
of journals, a set of departments, a set of scholars, etc., unless we already know
the field? And how canwe know the field unless we know its journals, its research
institutions, and its leading scholars? The answer is not that it is hopeless, but that
it requires an iterative process whereby the views of the informetrics researchers
must be developed, considering the perspective of other meta-sciences, and form
their opinion of which views of the field their map ismeant to be a tool to support.
A basic principle of critical theory has been formulated in this way:
In retrospect the most important contribution of critical theory to philosophy in the late
twentieth centurywould seem tobe their criticismof positivismand their demand that social
theory be reflective; that is, that theorists try to be as aware as possible of their own posi-
tion, the origin of their beliefs and attitudes, and the possible consequences their theorizing
might have on what they are studying.
(Geuss, 1998, p. 728)
Using this principle of critical theory in bibliometrics may be termed “critical
informetrics” and here we shall have a look at how former bibliometric inves-
tigations have been re-examined from such a critical perspective. Spear (2007)
criticized former bibliometric studies of the so-called cognitive revolution in
psychology. Among his findings are that subfields may develop independently
to overall paradigm shifts in a discipline and that scholarly fields may have self-
interest in appearing successful. Therefore, “flagship publications” may not be a
good place to look for criticism of main stream assumptions (see also Toomela,
2014, about common assumptions in mainstream research). Spear provided con-
vincing arguments and new empirical results questioning former studies. Spear
also emphasised the important ethical issues in simplistic bibliometric conclu-
sions:
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We can argue about indicators, data sources, and forms of analysis, but in the end what we
likely learn is that there are many ways to tell a complex story. The problem, of course, is
that the outcome of this story has real and important implications for the distribution of or-
ganizational resources. If indeed every dean, every granting agency, and every department
head “knows” that there has been a cognitive revolution or that a cognitive neuroscience
revolution is afoot, thenwhere does that leave the claims of those who do not identify them-
selves with cognitive psychology or, worse yet, those who identify with behavioral analysis?
There is much at stake in how the history of psychology is told.
(Spear, 2007, p. 377)
This may be generalized: there is much at stake in how the history and bibliomet-
ric patterns of any domain are represented.
Is the pragmatic/critical view trivial?
Are informetrics researchers well aware of the importance of the pragmatic/
critical philosophy outlined in this article? Is it a triviality? Inmy opinion, it is not.
Although there have been some critical voices, mainstream research in this field it
is still reflecting the positivist model. For example, Henry Small has claimed that
co-citation studies—in opposition to manually constructed bibliographies—does
not involve subjective decisions:
Either an existing bibliography is used, or subject experts are called upon to comb the litera-
ture and select relevant items. The bibliography then becomes the data base for subsequent
analyses of the specialty, including its growth and structural characteristics. To the extent
that this approach is based upon subjective decisions of relevance by the individual(s) com-
piling the bibliography, the analysis is open to criticism for possible bias and lack of re-
producibility. The principal difficulty with this approach is that it is almost impossible to
establish precise criteria as to what should or should not be included within the boundaries
of the subject. The method employed here, on the other hand, uses a clustering algorithm
to establish these boundaries; it involves no subjective decisions on what is to be included or
excluded from the specialty literature.
(Small, 1977, p. 140, italics added)
Precisely the same argument was put forward 37 years later by Andersen, Bazer-
man and Schneider (2014, p. 317), whowrote: “Scientometricmaps provide a kind
of description of the cognitive or social structure of a research area independent
of subjective judgments and relevance criteria”¹⁰ and I have already discussed
how Boyack and Klavans (2010) asked “Which citation approach represents the
10 Subsequently Bazermanwrote in an email: “Birger, Goodpoint. […]Nonetheless, the sentence
does not say that the description provided is definitive or an ultimate or fully objective reality–
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research front most accurately” as an example that I find represent mainstream
informetrics research. Furthermore, informetric research often uses similarity
measures about which Ellis, Furner-Hines and Willett wrote:
Even in the field of numerical taxonomy, where the use of similarity coefficients has been
even more widespread than in information retrieval, Jackson, Somers and Harvey (1989)
were moved to conclude that ‘the choice of a similarity coefficient is largely subjective and
often based on tradition or on a posteriori criteria such as the ‘interpretability’ of the re-
sults”, and went on to quote Gordon (1987): ‘Human ingenuity is quite capable of providing
a post hoc justification of dubious classifications.’
(Ellis et al. 1993, 144)
They conclude:
We agree with Kruskal (1964) ‘that each scientific area that has use for different measures of
proximity should after appropriate argument and trial, settle down on those measures most
useful for its needs.’ Formost applications in information retrieval, thehistorical attachment
to the simple, linear, association coefficients provided by the Dice and cosine formulae is in
no need of revision.
(Ellis et al., 1993, 145)
What I miss in this paper—and in the whole of mainstream research in informa-
tion retrieval and bibliometrics—is the consideration that any two things may be
considered similar in many different ways. There is no such thing as measuring
similarity objectively. There should always be an argument about the perspective
from which two things (e.g., documents) are considered similar. This is a well-
known problem in biological taxonomy in which different species may have de-
veloped similar bones and other criteria of similarity in order to adjust to the same
environmental possibilities.
There have, of course, been researchers who have pointed out bias, uncer-
tainty, theoretical divergences, and subjectivity in informetrics research (for a
compilation, see Cronin & Sugimoto, 2015). What I believe has seldom—if ever—
been claimed explicitly is the principal unavoidability of such bias and subjectivity
and, by consequence, the necessity of acknowledgement of the researcher’s
standpoint.
only that it provides a description that is independent of interpretive judgments. But of course
scientometric methods themselves include criteria and procedural judgments. While it is hard to
reconstruct my state of mind while revising the text, I likely was thinking that it referred to the
kinds of narrative interpretation that historians or participants might give and I did not stop to
consider the assumptions embedded within scientometrics. […] Chuck”
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One argument that my claim is trivial was put forward in an informal commu-
nication with a bibliometric scholar:
It is well known that the results of bibliometric investigations often are expressed as
probabilities—usually a confidence interval at 95 percent is accepted. In other words is
it accepted that there may be up to five percent probability that the result is due to random
outcome. This is more or less accepted standard in the social sciences. In this is also given
a clear expression that the result is not necessarily “the objective truth”.
(Informal communication, January 12, 2015)
This argument does not catch my point, however. One thing is whether there is a
statically uncertainty in results, another thing iswhether there is a systematic bias
due to the researcher’s subjectivity. The belief that a certain result is within a cer-
tain confidence interval is still based on positivist assumptions. As an anonymous
reviewer of this chapter wrote:
The general argument that the results of informetric studies should not be treated as ob-
jective truths is by no means new.¹¹ I think there is scope for making reference to a wider
selection of previous work, published in the information science literature, in which similar
conclusions are drawn.
The reviewer subsequently, ondemand, referred to Edge (1979), Hicks (1987),Mac-
Roberts and MacRoberts (1989) and Sullivan, White, and Barboni, (1977).
My first answer is that it is correct that there have been critical voices about
bibliometric studies, and I consider the four examples mentioned by the reviewer
as being outside mainstream informetrics research. Of these four papers two
(Edge, 1979 and Sullivan, White, & Barboni, 1977) is more in line with my post-
Kuhnian position while the other two seem to be more in line with the positivist
position.
Hicks (1987) compared co-citation analysis with a manually generated bib-
liography in the specialty of “spin glass” and found that co-citation analysis is
a “premature” method for science policy decisions, but that further work may
improve its reliability and robustness. She describes the subjectivity involved in
co-citation analysis but overall her paper seems to suggest—in contradiction to
the present chapter—that such subjectivity may be removed when themethod be-
comesmature. She further wrote that “The identification of ‘specialties’ is fraught
with theoretical and empirical difficulties, which remain unresolved” (p. 304),
which we have already discussed.
11 See footnote 7 about the pragmatic view of realism and objectivity and the reviewer’s misin-
terpretation of my statements.
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MacRoberts and MacRoberts (1989) discussed seven kinds of problems in ci-
tation analysis (i.e., formal influences not cited; biased citing; information influ-
ences not cited; self-citing; different types of citation; variations in citation rate
placed to type of publication, nationality, time period, and the size and type of
specialty; and technical limitations of citation indices and bibliographies). They
concluded:
Consequently, whether or not, and in what ways, citations can be used as data remains
unclear and will continue so until all aspects of citation analysis—the theories and assump-
tions that inform it, as well as the data upon which it is based—are subjected to careful
scrutiny. Until this is done, any results obtained by using citations as data will, at best, have
to be considered tentative.
(MacRoberts and MacRoberts, 1989, p. 347)
This study also tries to identify kind of errors in order to eliminate them rather
than it is reflecting the view that the bibliometric analyst should argue about his
or her view of the represented domain (although this view may be implicit in the
paper).
Sullivan, White, and Barboni (1977) examined Henry Small’s claim that co-
citation analysis “involves no subjective decisions on what is to be included or
excluded from the specialty literature” and concluded:
The potential biases of which Small speaks [in constructingmanual bibliographies] are real,
and we find it necessary in our work to be as aware as possible of them. But there are biases
involved in co-citation analysis, as well.
(Sullivan, White, & Barboni, 1977, p. 236)
In other words, this paper confirms the thesis about the subjectivity in infor-
metrics. About the data used for examining the co-citation structure, the authors
admit (p. 225): “We do not claim that this intellectual history is necessarily the
true picture”. The difference between this view and my own view is that I would
assume that any intellectual history reflects a specific perspective, and therefore
suggests that some work is made illuminating different possible perspectives and
how different methodological choices supports one or another perspective.
Edge (1979) is the paper that comes closest tomy own view. It discusses quan-
titative methods in historical and sociological studies of modern astronomy and
writes:
…my overall approach is critical. I am not convinced by the stronger claims of the propo-
nents of these quantitative methods. I want to argue that those who adopt these methods
(and, in particular, citation analysis)make implicit assumptions about thenature of science:
and, moreover, that what they gloss over as unproblematic are precisely the points which
many of us find to be crucially at issue.
(Edge, 1979, p. 102)
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One of the important conclusions in his paper is:
These [bibliometric] data certainly make our case more convincing! However, it is impor-
tant to stress the derivative quality of these figures, which have (in my mind) the status of
secondary validation only. Essentially, our picture is derived from our ‘soft’ data.
(Edge, 1979, p. 126)
Edge is not rejecting quantitative studies, but finds that they should be used crit-
ically and based on qualitative knowledge. He is not—as I am—referring to phi-
losophy of science, Thomas Kuhn, critical theory or pragmatism, but his paper
is explicitly “critical”. Perhaps an explicit engagement with critical philosophy
could have made his analyses even deeper by helping to uncover conflicting per-
spectives and interests in the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the domain.
The examples given in this section demonstrates inmy opinion that the philo-
sophical position defended in this paper is not trivial.
The historicist revolution and its implications for informetrics
and information science
We saw that Kuhn introduced a historicist approach in the philosophy of science.
The historical perspective has changed biological taxonomy (under the name
“cladism”) and may also have the potential of making a scientific revolution in
information science and informetrics:
Citation analysis can be compared to the paradigm shift in biological taxonomy over recent
decades. The classical approach to biological classification (exemplified by the Linnaean
taxonomy) is based on classifying organisms on the basis of shared properties (e.g., number
of stamens), that is to classify according to similarity of certain properties. Cladism repre-
sents a paradigm shift in biology in which organisms are classified solely on the basis of a
commonancestor (by Ereshefsky, 2000, called ‘the historical approach’). This newapproach
has made fundamental changes in the classification of plants and animals and this revolu-
tion is not yet complete. In the same way as cladism represents a revolution in biological
taxonomy, citation analysis may be considered a revolution in KO [knowledge organization]
and information retrieval. Both are based on a historical rather than a structural approach to
classification. The implication for KO is that the domains and scholarly traditions to which
documents belong are considered theirmost important criteria of classification (rather than,
for example, their statistical word patterns). Scholarly theories determine what is to be con-
sidered related and different theories imply different criteria of relatedness.
(Hjørland, 2013, p. 1321)
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Traditional information science and information retrieval tend to consider docu-
ments as isolated phenomena and to compare their individual characteristics.¹²
Informetrics is the most obvious perspective to consider documents as part of a
tradition and therefore to apply a historicist perspective (although this is not al-
ways the case). At this point, it shall just be stated that amore consequent histori-
cist philosophymayhave the potential to transform the field in a fruitful direction.
Non-scholarly domains
We have now considered informetrics in the perspective of the philosophy of sci-
ence. Are these perspectives also relevant to broader perspectives than just schol-
arly domains? To make such a generalisation means to move from the theory of
science to the theory of knowledge and cognition. My answer is yes: Any domain
(e.g., sport, religion, education, law, eHealthor e-commerce)maybeperceiveddif-
ferently, there is never just one, neutral and objective, way to describe a field. It is
important to consider from which perspective and for which purpose documents
are described and the relevance of information is evaluated. Google, for example,
is not a neutral search engine (even if we consider only so-called “organic search”
as opposed to advertisements). One could say that in principle any search engine
is always a cultural-political agent making priorities in relation to what content
should be relatively findable and what should remain relatively invisible.
Kuhn’s theory has not just been influential in the philosophy of science, but
also, for example, in psychology. “Theory theory” (Weiskopf, 2011) is a psycho-
logical theory that understands children’s thinking as corresponding to scientists’
way of thinking: Children have “theories”whichmay change like paradigm shifts.
Therefore, principles from the philosophy of science may have potential as a gen-
eral foundation for informetrics.
12 An anonymous reviewer commented: ”I would disagree, given the emphasis even in ‘tradi-
tional’ information retrieval on measures like tf.idf that take into account the collection-wide
frequencies of terms as well as within-document frequencies, on thesauri built on term co-
occurrence data, etc. Today’s web search algorithms, of course, are heavily link-based, and in no
sense treat documents as independent.” Answer: Yes, traditional IR often considers documents
as parts of collections or as being interlinked. Still, however, they do not consider the single docu-
ment as part of a genre and a tradition andnoof the approachesmentionedby the reviewer canbe
considered historicist. In biology related methods are known as numeric taxonomic approaches,
but they are considered different from cladistics (historical) methods.
42 | Birger Hjørland
A paradox
This paper is termed Informetrics needs a foundation in the theory of science.
However, the theory of science distinguishes between two kinds of epistemol-
ogy: (1) Foundationalism (a secure foundation of certainty exists) and (2) Anti-
foundationalism (no fundamental belief or principle provides the basis or founda-
tion for inquiry and knowledge); justification of knowledge claims is understood
here as a function of a relationship between beliefs, none of which are privileged
as maintained by foundationalist theories of justification. The paradox is that
the philosophical foundation I suggest for informetrics is anti-foundationalism.
This is, however, only a contradiction in the word used in the title: there is no
contradiction in subscribing to anti-foundationalism.
Conclusion
The main point raised in the present paper is that insights from the theory of
science are important for informetrics. A bibliometric study or measure cannot
be judged from a neutral “view from nowhere”, but is always—consciously or
unconsciously—engaged in the theoretical issues in the field studied. The two
most important implications of a post-Kuhnian view of informetrics are:
1. Bibliometric researchers need to consider domain-knowledge and its theoreti-
cal foundation: they have to stand in relation to different views on the domain
being investigated; and,
2. The objects of bibliometric studies—the documents—must be understood
in relation to the broader contexts in which they are produced, used, and
cited. Concepts like “research tradition”, “paradigms”, “genres”, “activity
systems”, and the like are framework concepts necessary for deeper interpre-
tation and analysis of bibliometric patterns.
Where is Blaise Cronin situated in relation to this view of information science?
The following quote illuminates this question:
The texts we write and the texts we cite bear the marks of the epistemic cultures, socio-
cognitive networks and physical places to which we belong at the different stages of our
professional lives.
(Cronin, 2005, p. 1)
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This understanding of “epistemic cultures” and their importance for informetrics
and information science reflects the basic idea of the present paper: The fruitful-
ness of a social and epistemological basis for the field.
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